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Abstract. This paper studies the modelling of legal reasoning about evidence within general
theories of defeasible reasoning and argumentation. In particular, Wigmore’s method for charting
evidence and its use by modern legal evidence scholars is studied in order to give a formal
underpinning in terms of logics for defeasible argumentation. Two notions turn out to be crucial,
viz. argumentation schemes and empirical generalisations.

1. Introduction
This paper addresses the formal modelling of legal reasoning about evidence
within general theories of defeasible reasoning and argumentation. In AI and
Law evidential reasoning is a little studied topic. Of the few studies that have
been made, some zoom in on speciﬁc aspects, such as Lutomski (1989) on
reasoning with statistical evidence, and Bromby and Hall (2002) on the
credibility of eyewitness testimonies. Other research takes its starting point in
mathematical or computational models, such as probability theory (e.g.,
Jøsang and Bondi 2000) or model-based reasoning for automated diagnosis
(e.g., Keppens and Zeleznikow 2003). We instead follow a more cognitively
inspired approach, aiming to stay close to the evidential reasoning forms used
in practice. Thus we hope that our approach might better lead to practically
useful software applications, such as knowledge-based systems, and sensemaking systems.
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Knowledge-based systems, which are the prime focus of AI and Law
research, contain knowledge about a certain problem domain and reason
with this knowledge in order to solve a certain concrete problem, or at least
to suggest alternative solutions to it. Both Bromby and Hall (2002) and
Keppens and Zeleznikow (2003) attempt to build a knowledge-based system
for evidential reasoning. Sense-making systems (see e.g., Kirschner et al.
2003) do not themselves reason to solve a problem. Instead, the goal of such
software is to support humans in making sense of a problem. To this end,
they provide tools for structuring (usually visualising) the problem and the
user’s reasoning in solving it. Often they also provide tools for manipulating
these structures, e.g., by converting one visualisation into another, by
combining pieces of information, or by performing logical or probabilistic
computations on the user’s input. In addition, some sense-making systems
also support the communication between diﬀerent people working on the
same problem. An early example of sense-making software for evidential
reasoning is Tiller and Schum’s MarshalPlan project (Schum and Tillers
1991), an early, pre-world-wide-web Hypertext application that supports
preliminary fact investigations. Two general sense-making systems within AI
and Law are Loui et al. (1997) Room 5 system and Verheij’s (1999) ArguMed
system. A domain independent sense-making system that supports the use of
argumentation schemes is Reed and Rowe’s (2001) Araucaria system. All
systems mentioned thus far are still experimental; a commercial sense-making
system for evidential reasoning currently being developed is Legal Apprentice, jointly developed by Vern Walker and Legal Apprentice Inc.1
The main diﬀerence between knowledge-based and sense-making systems
is that the latter have no knowledge base, i.e., no collection of permanently
stored general knowledge about a certain domain. This means that for
building sense-making systems, unlike for knowledge-based systems, no
laborious and diﬃcult knowledge-acquisition phase is necessary. This is very
signiﬁcant for applications to evidential reasoning, for which knowledge
acquisition seems particularly hard.
Since both knowledge-based and sense-making software are supposed to
support humans in realistic professional or educational contexts, such
software arguably has a better chance of acceptance if it is based on the
reasoning forms used in practice. In the context of legal reasoning about
evidence, the use and naturalness of statistical methods has been heavily
debated (e.g., Tribe 1971; Lempert 1986; Wagenaar et al., 1993; Schum
1994). Although such methods certainly have their use (see e.g., Kadane and
Schum 1996 for an insightful probabilistic analysis of the famous Sacco and
Vanzetti case), there are several reasons for taking a diﬀerent approach.
Firstly, statistical methods require numbers as input, and in the majority of
legal cases reliable numbers are very hard to obtain, either because there are
no reliable statistics, or because legal experts are unable or reluctant to
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provide numerical estimates. Secondly, probabilistic networks have additional limitations which are especially problematic for sense-making systems.
Essentially, probabilistic networks compile all available knowledge into a
probability distribution over certain variables of interest, and thus conceal
some important distinctions of ordinary evidential reasoning. One such
distinction concerns relationships between evidence, and the rhetorical,
dialectical structure of discourse: legal disputes often consist of an exchange
of explicit arguments and counterarguments, stated by opposing sides of the
dispute. Moreover, probabilistic networks blur the distinction between
directly relevant and ancillary evidence. (Ancillary evidence is evidence that
has a bearing on the probative force of directly relevant evidence. A typical
example is information on the credibility of a witness.) Schum (2001, p. 1948)
remarks that the need for ancillary evidence especially arises when the
conditional probabilities cannot be established by statistical relative frequencies. Moreover, even when such statistics are available, one may still need
ancillary evidence, since lawyers often try to undermine the use of statistics
by their adversary. For all these reasons it is important to study alternative
accounts of evidential reasoning, which can deal with the predominantly
qualitative and adversarial nature of legal reasoning about evidence.
We take as our starting point a speciﬁc technique developed in legal
theory, studying a method for structuring evidential reasoning that goes back
to John Henry Wigmore (1931). Wigmore developed a graphical method for
charting legal evidence, a tool for making sense of a large body of evidence.
Stripped to the bones, his charts depict the arguments that can be constructed
from a given body of evidence, as well as possible sources of doubt with
respect to these arguments. At the time, Wigmore’s charting method went
largely unnoticed but it was recently rediscovered by Anglo-American ‘‘new
evidence scholars’’, for example, Anderson and Twining (1991), Schum and
Tillers (1991) and Schum (1994). Today his method looks surprisingly
modern, anticipating recent AI models of defeasible reasoning as well as
recent sense-making software for argument visualisation. Our present aim is
to explore both of these directions, capturing some of the ‘logic’ underlying
Wigmore’s charts in an outline of a formal account of evidential reasoning in
terms the work of John Pollock (1987, 1995, 1998) on defeasible argumentation, and illustrating this account with a case study using argument
visualisation techniques. We have chosen Pollock’s approach since its
emphasis on epistemology makes it suitable for modelling evidential
reasoning. A crucial element in our account is the notion of argumentation
schemes. When looking at evidential reasoning (or indeed at reasoning in
general), one sees that many arguments, as well as attacks on them, are
instances of recurring patterns, such as inferences from witness or expert
testimonies, causal arguments, or temporal projections. The idea of systematising reasoning in terms of such argumentation schemes rather than just

128

FLORIS BEX ET AL.

in terms of abstract principles of inference is the subject of much current
study in argumentation theory. In fact, a great deal of AI (and Law) work
can also be regarded as studying argumentation schemes (although it is
usually not presented as such). For instance, we think that John Pollock’s
work on prima facie reasons is of this kind, as is much AI and Law research
on modelling legal argument. However, to our knowledge, the only AI and
Law work that addresses argumentation schemes for evidential reasoning
directly is Lutomski (1989), who studies ways of using and attacking
statistical evidence.
In light of this, the aim of this paper is twofold:
• Showing how recent developments in legal evidence theory can be
analysed with formal models of defeasible reasoning.
• Arguing for the relevance of the idea of argumentation schemes to
models of evidential reasoning, and indicating a possible formalisation
of reasoning with such schemes.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 Wigmore’s
charting method is discussed by way of a simple example chart from his
original work, and in Section 3 the notion of argumentation schemes is
introduced. Then Section 4 outlines a formal account of Wigmore-style
evidential reasoning with argumentation schemes within the formal framework of Pollock and applies it to the same example chart. In Section 5 a more
detailed case study is carried of a modern use of Wigmore’s charting method
by Kadane and Schum (1996) in their probabilistic analysis of the Sacco and
Vanzetti case and some conclusions are drawn from it in Section 6. We end in
Section 7 with a comparison with related work and some issues for future
research.
This paper is an extended and revised version of Prakken et al. (2003) and
it also reuses some material from Prakken (2004). The discussion in Prakken
et al. (2003) of argument visualisation has here been mostly omitted to allow
space for the addition of a detailed second case study (Section 5, adapted
from Bex 2003), and an exploration of the issues of accrual of reasons and
witness testimonies (Section 6).

2. Wigmore’s charting method
A Wigmore chart looks very much (in broad outline) like the kind of
argument diagram often used in logic textbooks to visualise the inferential
structure of a given specimen of natural language argumentation. In an
argument diagram the various premises and conclusions are represented as
statements (propositions). The diagram is a set of points joined by lines. Each
point represents a statement. Each statement is only represented once on the
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diagram. Each line represents an inference from one or more statements to
another statement. Because it represents an inference, each line is normally
drawn as an arrow, indicating a direction of the inference from premises to
conclusion. Such a diagram is fairly simple. It looks like a directed graph of
the kind so familiar in AI. A Wigmore chart looks like this too, but has all
kinds of special features and notation that make it highly distinctive. The
purpose of the Wigmore chart is to represent the proof of facts in the
evidence presented on either side in a trial. Thus there are all kinds of special
notations for distinguishing features like circumstantial evidence as opposed
to testimonial evidence. It is best to begin with an example, to explain how
the Wigmore evidence chart works.

2.1.

AN EXAMPLE: THE UMILIAN CASE

The best source on charting is the second edition of Wigmore’s Principles
(1931). In this book, Wigmore (1931, pp. 62–66) used the case of
Commonwealth v. Umilian (1901, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
177 Mass. 582) to illustrate how method of evidence charts can be used in an
actual case. A combination of two small charts for one aspect of the case that
Wigmore himself used (1931, pp. 56, 59) is displayed in Figure 1.
Each arrow represents an inference. Wigmore describes it as ‘‘provisional
force given to an inference by aﬃrmatory evidence, testimonial or circumstantial’’. What the arrows join together (the circles, squares, and so forth)
are ‘‘kinds of evidence’’ representing ‘‘human assertions’’ oﬀered as
‘‘testimonial facts’’ or ‘‘circumstantial facts’’ (p. 52). These could be called

Figure 1. A Wigmore chart for the Umilian case.

130

FLORIS BEX ET AL.

‘‘facts’’ for short. Circumstantial evidence is represented by a square, while
testimonial evidence is represented by a circle. A triangle represents
corroborative evidence that strengthens or supports an inference. For
example (p. 53), ‘‘No third person was near the parties when the knife was
found’’ or ‘‘Witness stood close by, was not excited, (and) was (a)
disinterested spectator’’. An angle represents ‘‘explanatory evidence’’ that
explains away the eﬀect of some other evidence (p. 53). A double bar at the
top line of the angle tells us that this explanatory evidence was oﬀered by the
defendant. A dot within any of these symbols means ‘‘we now believe it to be
a fact’’. The inﬁnity symbol below a fact means that the fact was ‘‘observed
by a tribunal, or judicially admitted or noticed’’ (p. 53). For example, a
witness’s assertion made in court on the witness stand would ﬁt this category,
or a coat shown in court (p. 52).
There are some bits of Wigmore’s notation that are less clearly explained.
Notice that some lines have arrows while other do not, and some lines have
an X on them. The X on the line signiﬁes that the inference represented by the
line is ‘‘a strong one’’ (Wigmore 1931, p. 55). Also, the positioning of the
facts, that is whether the lines are vertical or horizontal, seems to be
signiﬁcant. Wigmore tells us ‘‘A supposed fact tending to prove or disprove
the existence of another fact is placed below it’’, whereas an explanatory fact
‘‘tending to lessen or strengthen the force’’ of a fact, is place to the right or
left of it.
The case of Commonwealth v. Umilian was a murder trial in which
Umilian was accused of murdering Jedrusik. Wigmore presented many
details of the evidence in the case. It would take too long to try to
present all of this evidence. Instead we present a summary, consisting
mainly of those facts of the case that are represented on the small chart
in Figure 1.

2.2.

SOME FACTS OF THE CASE

U (Umilian) and J (Jedrusik) worked together as farm labourers until one
day in December 1899 when J disappeared. In April, his headless body was
found in the well 500 feet from the barn. In November, U had gone to a
priest to have the marriage ceremony performed between him and a woman
who had been working as a maid at the farm. He found that the priest had
received a letter charging him with having a wife and children in the old
country. The priest to refuse to marry him, and sent someone to investigate
the letter. It turned out that J had written the letter and that its contents were
not true. U was then married by the priest, but showed that he was very
angry with J, and made threats of vengeance against him. There was much
other circumstantial and testimonial evidence listed by Wigmore, but the gist
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of it, in relation to the small chart, is that U and J were isolated in the area of
the barn for the period around the murder, so if anyone other than U had
committed the murder, it is highly likely that he or she would have been
detected.
With every chart Wigmore presented a ‘‘key list’’ numbering all the facts.
Below are set out the various facts from Wigmore’s key list (pp. 64–66) that
appear on the small chart. Z, he tells us (p. 56) is ‘‘one of the ultimate
probanda under the pleadings, viz. that the accused killed the deceased’’. (A
probandum is something that has to be proven.) Note that, since we combine
two separate charts, the numbers 18–20 are each used for two diﬀerent nodes.
The nodes referred to in the key list as 18(2), 19(2) and 20(2) can be found in
the chart’s bottom left corner.
Key list
Z:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
18.1:
18(2):
19:
19.1:
19(2):
21:
19d:
20:
20.1:
20(2):

The charge that U killed J.
Revengeful murderous emotion toward J.
J’s falsely charging U with bigamy, trying to prevent the marriage.
Letter received by priest stating that U already had a family in the
old country.
Anonymous witnesses to 10.
J was author of letter (although it was in a ﬁctitious name).
Anonymous witnesses to 12.
Letter communicated by priest to U.
Anonymous witnesses to 14.
Letter’s statements were untrue.
Anonymous witnesses to 16.
U’s marriage being ﬁnally performed, U would not have had a
strong feeling of revenge.
Wigmore does not tell us what this represents. Maybe it is witness
testimony.
The witness is biased.
U and J remaining in daily contact, wound must have rankled.
Witness to daily contact.
The witness is a discharged employee of U.
Anonymous witness to 19(2).
Discharged employees are apt to have an emotion of hostility.
Wife remaining there, jealousy between U and J probably continued.
Witness to wife remaining.
The witnesses’s strong demeanor of bias while on the stand.

Putting all these components together, it is possible to get an overview of the
evidence represented on the small chart, and see how all the various items of
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evidence ﬁt together in an inferential structure leading to the ultimate
probandum Z.
We now proceed to summarizing Wigmore’s explanation of argumentation represented in the small chart (pp. 56–57, 9). Circle 8 is the
revengeful murderous emotion. The arrow from 8 to Z ‘‘signiﬁes
provisional force’’ that 8 gives to Z. 9 is J’s attempt to prevent U from
marrying. It gives provisional force to 8. The dot in 8 indicates that it is
believed by the drawer of the chart that the revengeful emotion was
excited. Angle 18, just to the left of 8, is the fact that U actually married
the woman, which tends to explain away the revengeful emotion. Square
18.1 is the testimony to the fact of marriage. The inﬁnity symbol beneath
it means that the evidence was heard in court. Triangle 19 means that U
and J remained in daily contact after the marriage, thus keeping the
emotion alive. Triangle 20 means that the wife remained there, and thus
the emotion was intensiﬁed. That covers the top half of the chart. Looking
now at the bottom half, 9 represents J’s attempts to prevent the marriage.
Each of 10, 12, 14 and 16 are bits of circumstantial evidence that go
towards supporting 9. The line across these four arrows meeting the arrow
that goes to 9 represents a ‘‘composite fact’’ joining all four elements 10,
12, 16 and 14. Each of these is individually backed by a bit of testimonial
evidence – 11, 13, 15 and 17, respectively. The composite fact line is
reminiscent of what is called a linked argument in modern argument
diagramming. Finally, the bottom left part of the chart (which Wigmore
actually depicted as a separate chat on p. 59) represents an attack on the
truthfulness of one of the witnesses. Angle 18(2), placed just left of square
17, stands for the attack that one of the witness testifying to 16 was
biased, while the structure below angle 18(2) represents support for the
claim of bias.
There are good reasons to study the Wigmore chart. The diagram, when it
is stripped to its essentials, and when some newly discovered features of
argument structure have been incorporated, can reveal the logical structure
of evidential reasoning in a powerful way, and this structure can be extremely
useful for automating legal argumentation of the kind especially prominent
in evidence law. Thus the theoretical implications for logic, law and AI are
quite deep.
One very important aspect of Wigmore’s method, as emphasized also by
the new evidence scholars, is that he sees charting not primarily as an attempt
to express reasons for belief but to express reasons for doubt. Wigmore’s
basic purpose is more critical than constructive. It is to lay bare the
possibilities of doubt by making the weak points in a chain of argumentation
explicit. It shares this purpose with recent developments in argumentation
theory. Argumentation schemes represent typical presumptive forms of
reasoning that need to be analysed and evaluated in speciﬁc cases by using
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matching sets of critical questions. The critical questions function as a device
to help make doubts explicit.

3. Argumentation schemes
Argumentation schemes are forms of argument that represent stereotypical
patterns of human reasoning. Among other things, they have been applied to
model structures of human reasoning that are troublesome to view deductively, and that have even been classiﬁed as fallacious in the past. Although
such arguments can sometimes be fallacious, in other instances they can be
reasonable. For example, appealing to expert opinion could be reasonable if
the ﬁeld of the expert is appropriate, and other conditions are met. But, of
course, as the logic texts have so often pointed out, such arguments can
sometimes be fallacious appeal to authority. One might try to ‘‘deductivize’’
the reasonable instances, by viewing the major premise as a conditional that is
true if the authority is knowledgeable. For example, a deductivist might view
the major premise as the material implication: if X says A then A is true. But
this deductivist strategy fails, unless the authority is omniscient, meaning that
epistemic closure of the knowledge base can be assumed. But it is rare, if it
ever occurs, that an expert knows everything, and thus that her knowledge in a
domain is beyond challenge. Thus for many, or perhaps even all cases of
appeal to expert opinion, the deductivist approach does not work. Thus the
motivation for much recent research into argumentation schemes has been
this tension between forms of argument that are clearly reasonable in some
instances, but that cannot be analysed as deductively valid (Kienpointner
1992; Walton 1996a; Reed and Walton 2001).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) cited numerous distinctive kinds of
arguments that shift a weight of evidence on a balance of considerations.
Hastings (1963) worked out the ﬁrst modern taxonomy of argumentation
schemes. A comprehensive list of argumentation schemes has been oﬀered by
Kienpointner (1992). Some schemes classiﬁed as presumptive in Walton
(1996a) are: argument from sign, argument from example, argument from
commitment, argument from position to know, argument from expert
opinion, argument from analogy, argument from precedent, argument from
gradualism, and the slippery slope argument.

3.1.

ARGUMENT FROM EXPERT OPINION

Argument from expert opinion is not only a very common form of
argumentation, it is also highly controversial. It is represented by the
following argumentation scheme in the analysis given in Walton (1996a, p. 65).
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Source E is an expert in domain D.
E asserts that proposition A is known to be true (false).
A is within D
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
As shown by experiments in social psychology, there is a tendency to defer to
experts, sometimes without questioning, resulting in fallacious appeals to
authority. When confronted with such an appeal, the best reaction is to have
some critical questions ready. The following six basic critical questions
matching the appeal to expert opinion have been recommended in Walton
(1997, p. 223).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
Field Question: Is E an expert in D?
Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
Backup Evidence Question: Is A’s assertion based on evidence?

Expert testimony has become an increasingly important type of evidence, and
is the subject of much recent investigation (e.g., Malsch and Nijboer 1999;
Morsek 2001). For this reason the exact formulation of critical questions is
worth further study. Suﬃce it to say that, in many cases, asking one of the
basic critical questions above will lead to critical subquestions at a deeper
level of examination.
3.2.

APPEAL TO WITNESS TESTIMONY

The following argumentation scheme (taken from Walton 1996a, p. 61)
represents the form of appeal to witness opinion as an argument. The
variable W refers to a witness. A witness is an agent that has incoming
information about things it can perceive as facts or data, and that can relay
that information to another agent. The variable A stands for a statement (or
proposition, taken to be an equivalent term).
Witness W is in a position to know whether A is true or not.
Witness W asserts that A is true (false).
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
When evaluating an appeal to witness testimony, the evaluator has no direct
access to the evidence that the witness presumably possesses. This form of direct
veriﬁcation, by observation of the facts, is not possible. Hence the best the
evaluator can do is to test the consistency of the account given by the witness, to
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see if the account hangs together, and is consistent with other evidence that is
known about the case independently of the testimony. Probing into the
consistency of the witness’s account is achieved by asking critical questions.
Critical questions relating to consistency concern the internal consistency of
what the witness said, consistency with known external facts, and consistency
with what other witnesses said. Wagenaar et al. (1993, p. 38) have studied such
questions in evaluating the plausibility of witness testimony in accounts oﬀered
by witnesses in trials. Other critical questions important to cite in this
connection concern the bias of the witness and the plausibility of the account
oﬀered. There are many indicators of bias. One of the most important ones is
the ﬁnding that witness has something to gain by testifying in a certain way.
Another indicator is the language used by the witness. For example, the
language may have strong emotive connotations that are accusatory. Another
indicator of bias is the selectivity of the witness’s account. The account may
stress details on one side, but overlook details that should be on the other side. If
a witness is biased, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the witness is lying. The bias
could be unintentional. This plausibility factor can react on the evaluation of
the appeal to witness testimony in various ways. If the statement made by the
witness is highly implausible, it can backﬁre on the credibility of the witness.
However, in some cases, the implausibility of the statement made can actually
be a basis for conjecturing that what the witness claimed is really true. For
example, if two independent witnesses have made the same implausible claim, it
could suggest that their observations are careful and accurate.
The role of such critical questions has been discussed extensively in the legal
literature on witness testimony and examination. Schum (1994, p. 325) has
identiﬁed three requirements of the credibility of the testimony of a witness
that can be questioned: (1) veracity, or whether the witness believes what she
said, (2) objectivity, or whether what was reported corresponds to the event
believed, and (3) observational sensitivity, or observations of linkages between
events. Bromby and Hall (2002) devised a system to advise on the credibility of
witness testimony by citing factors of (1) competency, (2) compellability,
including the connection between the witness and the accused and any
immunity the witness may have, and (3) reliability, which includes position to
know factors. There remain many ﬁne points to be clariﬁed. What is most
important here, however, is to see how sequences of dialogue in legal cases can
involve complex argumentation in which asking critical questions can increase
or decrease the probative weight of an appeal to witness argument as evidence.

4. A formal interpretation of wigmore’s charts
In this section we propose a formal account of the reasoning underlying
Wigmore’s charts. In doing so we will ignore the ‘syntactic sugar’ used by
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Wigmore and concentrate on the following elements: the nodes (with possibly
a 1 label), the vertical links and the horizontal links.
Which formal account is plausible? Schum (1994) and Kadane and Schum
(1996) interpret them as a predecessor of Bayesian probabilistic networks.
However, as we pointed out in the introduction, there are good reasons to
explore an alternative interpretation of Wigmore’s charts, viz. as a forerunner
of theories of defeasible argumentation. In particular, we interpret the nodes
as standing for propositions, the vertical links as expressing defeasible
inferences, and the horizontal links as being relations of attack or defeat
between arguments. To capture the defeasible reasoning underlying the
charts, we choose to use Pollock’s argument-based framework for defeasible
reasoning (see e.g., Pollock 1987, 1995, 1998), since Pollock’s emphasis on
epistemological reasoning is very relevant for evidential reasoning, and his
notion of prima facie reasons is very similar to the notion of argumentation
schemes. Pollock’s framework is also convenient to translate into diagrams
that summarise the relationships between argument components. For this
task, the Araucaria system (Reed and Rowe 2001) could be used, as in
Figure 2 (in which convergent and linked support relationships are shown as
vertical arrows between propositions, refutations are horizontal lines,
enthymematic arguments are greyed, strength labels can mark edges, and

Figure 2. The Umilian case in Araucaria.
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propositions can be labelled with provenance). Araucaria is suﬃciently
ﬂexible to be able to handle Wigmore-style notation (Prakken et al. 2003),
Pollock-style inference graphs, as well as natural language argument.
In applying the framework, we will for simplicity restrict ourselves in the
following ways: we do not discuss suppositional arguments, and we ignore
issues of strength of arguments; instead, we focus only on the representation
of evidential knowledge and on the construction of evidential arguments and
counterarguments with such information. Moreover, since we aim to give a
general picture of how evidential reasoning ﬁts into the formal framework,
we will suppress many technical details of Pollock’s framework and we will
largely abstract from underlying issues of knowledge representation.

4.1.

OUTLINE OF POLLOCK’S FRAMEWORK

Essentially, Pollock augments the inference rules of classical logic (which he
calls ‘‘strict reasons’’) with a set of defeasible inference rules (which he calls
‘‘prima facie reasons’’), and he deﬁnes how defeasible inferences can be
attacked. Prima facie reasons are not meant to express domain-speciﬁc
generalisation; Pollock intends them to be general epistemic principles for
obtaining beliefs from other beliefs and perceptual inputs, such as memory,
statistical reasoning and induction. Arguments can be constructed by
chaining reasons, starting from given input information. As usual in logic,
arguments can be represented in two alternative but equivalent ways. To
express the order in which the inferences are made, Pollock sometimes
displays them as deductions, i.e., as sequences of formulas that are either
given as input information or are derived by applying a reason to one or
more earlier members in the sequence. This is also the form in which we will
display arguments below. To represent instead the inferential dependencies
between the propositions in an argument, Pollock sometimes represents
arguments as AND trees, where the links represent applications of reasons.
Finally, Pollock combines sets of such trees into an AND/OR graph and
adds defeat links between nodes, resulting in an ‘‘inference graph’’. Clearly,
such a graph is very similar to a Wigmore chart.
Pollock deﬁnes two ways in which a (defeasible) argument can be
defeated. Such an argument can be rebut with an argument for the opposite
conclusion, and it can be undercut with an argument why a prima facie reason
does not apply in the given circumstances. Consider, for instance, an
argument ‘‘The suspect was at the murder scene at the time of the murder
since witness John says so’’ (applying a prima facie reason ‘‘if a witness says
u, one may infer u’’). This argument is rebut by another application of the
same reason: ‘‘The suspect was not at the murder scene since witness Bob
says he was with him in the pub at the time of the murder, and one cannot be
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in two places at the same time’’. And the argument is undercut by ‘‘It was too
dark, so John could not have made a reliable identiﬁcation’’ (applying
another reason ‘‘if a witness says u but the circumstances make reliable
observation of u impossible, one may not infer u’’). Intuitively, undercutting
attacks do not argue that the attacked conclusion is false, but only that the
conclusion is not suﬃciently supported by its premises.
Finally, the dialectical status of an argument must be deﬁned, to identify
the defeasibly valid inferences. Since Pollock’s system results in a collection
of arguments and their binary defeat relations, Dung’s (1995) general
framework for argumentation is applicable. Pollock’s deﬁnition is equivalent
to Dung’s preferred semantics, but nothing prevents the use of another
appropriate semantics, such as Dung’s grounded semantics (used by e.g.,
Prakken and Sartor 1996).
What makes Pollock’s approach especially interesting for us is his work on
the various kinds of prima facie reasons, resulting in a general theory of
epistemic defeasible reasoning. For present purposes, ﬁve reasons are
especially relevant. We now paraphrase them and some of their undercutters
as deﬁned by Pollock (1987, 1995, 1998). Mostly, Pollock states them with
numerical probabilities, but since, as noted above, in legal contexts reliable
numbers are often not available, we give qualitative versions. We also leave
Pollock’s so-called ‘‘projectibility’’ conditions and some technical detail
implicit. As for notation, if principle R says that P is a prima facie reason for
Q, then ‘‘S is an undercutting defeater of R’’ is shorthand for ‘‘S is a prima
facie reason for ‘‘P is not a prima facie reason for Q’’ (this presupposes that
reasons can somehow be expressed in the object language).
The full picture can be summarised as follows. First perception is applied
to sense data, yielding speciﬁc beliefs, and memory is used to record and
retrieve these data. Then induction infers general rules from them, after which
the statistical syllogism derives new speciﬁc beliefs from these rules. Finally,
beliefs thus derived persist over time.
R1: Perception: Having a percept with content u is a prima facie reason to
believe u
In legal contexts perception applies to witness testimonies, but also to
tangible evidence as presented at trial. Pollock (1987) formulates a general
undercutter for perception, which we paraphrase as follows:
‘‘The present circumstances are such that having a percept with content u is
not a reliable indicator of u’’ undercuts R1.
Clearly, this undercutter is just the tip of the iceberg of theories on the
reliability of perception.
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R2: Memory: Recalling u is a prima facie reason to believe u.
Two undercutters deﬁned by Pollock (1987) are:
‘‘u was originally based on beliefs of which one is false’’ undercuts R2.
‘‘u was not originally believed for reasons other than R2’’ undercuts R2.
R3: Statistical syllogism: ‘c is an F’ and ‘F’s are usually G’s’ is a prima facie
reason for ‘c is a G’
This principle drives default reasoning with empirical generalisations. The
main undercutter is subproperty defeat, which we give both in a weak and a
strong qualitative form:
‘c is an F&H’ and ‘it is not the case that F&H’s are usually G’s’ is an
undercutter of R3.
‘c is an F&H’ and ‘F&H’s are usually not G’s’ is an undercutter of R3.
R4: Induction: ‘most observed F’s were G’s’ is a prima facie reason for ‘F’s are
usually G’s’
Pollock formulates various undercutters to induction based on bias of
samples.
R5: Temporal persistence: Believing that u is true at T1 is a prima facie reason
for believing u at a later time T2.
The general scheme for undercutters of temporal persistence arguments is
‘‘Having reason to believe : / at T3 between T1 and T2 is an undercutter of
R5’’.
(Actually, Pollock restricts this to percepts of : /). Temporal persistence is
an important aspect of evidential reasoning. For instance, in civil cases the
usual way to prove that one has a legal right (e.g., ownership) is to prove that
the right was created (e.g., by sale plus delivery). The other party must then
usually prove later events that terminated the right. Our two case studies will
illustrate that temporal-persistence arguments are also common in criminal
cases.
However, the temporal persistence scheme does not apply to all kinds of
facts. Clearly, many propositions, such as a position of a moving object, do
not typically persist in time, so they are not ‘‘temporally projectible’’.
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Pollock’s projectibility condition (which we have left implicit) is meant to
capture which kinds of facts tend to persist in time. A technical example of
propositions that are not temporally projectible is disjunctive weakenings of
a proposition. Suppose that P is observed to be true at T1. Then it follows
deductively that P  Q is true at T1, for any Q. If next : P is observed at T2,
then P does not persist after T2. However, if P  Q is allowed to persist from
T1, its persistence is not aﬀected by the observation of : P at T2, so P  Q
persists until T3. But then it deductively follows that Q is true at T3. This is,
of course, undesirable, so Pollock declares disjunctive weakenings of
propositions as not temporally projectible.
This completes our very brief overview of Pollock’s theory of epistemic
defeasible reasoning. We will now discuss how evidential reasoning as
captured in Wigmore’s charts can be reconstructed within this theory. Two
notions are especially important: generalisations and argumentation
schemes.

4.2.

GENERALISATIONS

One point stressed by current evidence theorists (e.g., Wagenaar et al. 1993;
Twining 1999) is the key role of empirical generalisations in evidential
reasoning. According to Schum (1994), such generalisations, which are
usually left implicit, are the ‘‘glue’’ which holds evidential arguments
together. For example, in Wigmore’s chart of the Umilian case, the inference
of node 8 from node 9 seems to presuppose the generalisation ‘‘If x tries to
prevent y’s marriage with false claims, a revengeful murderous emotion from
y towards x tends to be created’’. Clearly, the probative force of the inference
depends to a large extent on the strength of this generalisation. It might be
argued in this case that the tendency expressed by this generalisation is too
weak or does not exist; the point of making it explicit is to reveal this source
of doubt. (Interestingly, Wigmore’s chart also contains an explicit generalisation, viz. 19d).
4.2.1. Obtaining and Applying Generalisations
In Pollock’s framework, generalisations are applied with the statistical
syllogism, and part of their critical testing can be modelled as the search for
counterarguments. One subtlety not captured by our current qualitative
version of the syllogism is that generalisations often come with diﬀerent
modalities, such as ‘‘almost always, probably, usually, sometimes’’. This is an
issue that we leave for future research.
Something also seems to be missing from Pollock’s original account.
Pollock simply assumes that all generalisations are based on the reason from
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induction, and that attacks on generalisations can be expressed as undercutters of this reason. However, the generalisations used in legal evidential
reasoning are often not based on careful empirical testing, since in the
practical context of a trial such testing is usually impossible. In fact,
according to Twining (1999) they are often based on folk beliefs, infected
with value judgements, prejudice or ideology, and so on. Therefore, the
induction scheme must be supplemented with other sources of generalisations, and suitable undercutters for these sources must be formulated. We
now brieﬂy sketch how this could be done.
Anderson (1999) distinguishes ﬁve kinds of generalisations according to
their sources: scientiﬁc, expert-based, general knowledge, experience-based
and belief-based generalisations. The ﬁrst source is captured by the
induction scheme and the second source will be captured by the expert
testimony scheme (see below). Experience-based and perhaps also beliefbased generalisations seem to be based on a commonsense counterpart of
scientiﬁc induction (Pollock 1995, pp. 82–83). Furthermore, the generalknowledge source could be formulated as a new prima facie reason:
R6: general knowledge: ‘It is general knowledge that u’ is a prima facie reason
for u
Possible undercutters are that a piece of general knowledge is infected by
prejudice or value judgements, etcetera.
A typical argument is then analysed as follows (ending each line with the
reason with and the preceding lines from which the line is inferred, and
suppressing classical reasoning steps):
1. it is general knowledge that ‘‘If x tries to prevent y’s marriage with false
claims, then usually a revengeful murderous emotion from y towards x is
created’’. (Input);
2. so (presumably) If x tries to prevent y’s marriage with false claims, then
usually a revengeful murderous emotion from y towards x is created
(1, R6);
3. J tried to prevent U’s marriage with false claims (Input);
4. so (presumably) a revengeful murderous emotion from U towards J was
created’’ (2,3, Stat. Syll.).

4.2.2. Attacking Generalisations
Critically testing generalisations is just as important as obtaining and
applying them. In our account, four ways to attack a generalisation can be
modelled.
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1. Attacking the validity of the source of the generalisation, e.g., ‘‘it is not
general knowledge that If x tries to prevent y’s marriage with false claims,
then usually a revengeful murderous emotion from y towards x is
created’’. This attack can be modelled as a rebutting attack on a
subargument for the intermediate conclusion that something is general
knowledge.
2. Attacking the defeasible derivation from the source, for instance: ‘‘it is
indeed general knowledge that if x tries to prevent y’s marriage with
false claims, then usually a revengeful murderous emotion from y
towards x is created, but this particular piece of general knowledge is
infected by folk belief ’’. This attack can be modelled as an undercutter
of R6.
3. Attacking application of the generalisation in the given circumstances. This
can be modelled as the application of applying more speciﬁc generalisations (e.g., ‘‘If x tries to prevent y’s marriage with false claims but y is
known to be not violent and aggressive, then usually not a revengeful
murderous emotion from y towards x is created’’, or the weak form with
‘‘not usually’’). Then the subproperty defeater of the statistical syllogism
undercuts the use of the general default.
4. Attacking the generalisation itself. Such an attack takes the form of an
argument for the negation of the attacked generalisation (provided that
this can be expressed in the object language). An example of such an
attack is the combination of the above more speciﬁc generalisation with
the claim that the additional condition is not unusual, or perhaps even
that it is usual, as in ‘‘People are usually not aggressive and violent’’.
The main diﬀerence between attacks of the third and the fourth kind is that
the third kind of attack accepts the generalisation as a general rule, but denies
its application in the case at hand, while the fourth kind of attack denies the
generalisation as a general rule (‘‘it is not the case that usually ...’’). For a
more detailed discussion of this diﬀerence see Prakken (2004).

4.3.

ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES

We now turn to the formulation of argumentation schemes in Pollock’s
framework, focusing on the schemes from expert and witness testimony. The
main question is whether these schemes must be regarded as additional prima
facie reasons or as empirical generalisations: in the latter case applying the
schemes boils down to applying the (qualitative) statistical syllogism.
Technically, the main diﬀerence is that the body of reasons is ﬁxed while
generalisations can be inferred from, and attacked on the basis of, other
knowledge. The argumentation-theoretic literature is ambiguous about
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whether argumentation schemes can best be analysed as inference rules or as
generalised content (see Hitchcock (2003) for a similar discussion about
Toulmin’s notion of warrants). In this paper we have chosen to regard them
as defeasible inference rules, so (within Pollock’s framework) as prima facie
reasons. This is mainly since thus the representation of arguments is more
concise. However, formulating them instead as generalisations is straightforward. For instance, R6 can be formulated as the generalisation
If it is general knowledge that u then usually u
Then in the above argument an extra line 1’ between 1 and 2 must be added
containing this generalisation and 2 is then derived from 1 and 1’ by the
statistical syllogism. Undercutters of R6 should now be represented as
conﬂicting conditionals with a more speciﬁc antecedent. For example:
If it is general knowledge that u but u is infected with prejudice then it is not
the case that usually u
In cases where u is indeed infected with prejudice, this gives rise to an
instance of the subproperty defeater of the statistical syllogism.
We ﬁrst discuss the scheme from expert testimony. Its precise formulation
depends on what may be presumed. Suppose that the trustworthiness of the
expert and the availability of backup evidence may be presumed. This yields:
R7: Expert testimonies: ‘E says u and u is within domain S and E is expert in
domain S’ is a prima facie reason to believe u.
Of the critical questions listed above in Section 3.1, we believe that the ﬁrst is a
matter of adding strength of reasons to our account, the ﬁfth searches for
rebutting applications of the same scheme, while the second and third question
seem to be challenges of the premises of R7. This leaves the trustworthiness
and backup evidence question as possible pointers to undercutters. Alternatively, if the expert’s trustworthiness and the availability of backup evidence
cannot be presumed, these statements must be added as conditions of R7.
Next we discuss the scheme from witness testimony. Several formulations
of this scheme are possible. Our version follows the terminology of Schum
(1994). Recall from Section 3.2 that Schum decomposes the quality of a
witness testimony into three issues: the witness’ veracity, objectivity and
observational sensitivity. Objectivity and observational sensitivity are summarised in the ﬁrst premise of the scheme as presented in Section 3.2 while
veracity corresponds to the main critical question of the scheme as proposed
by Walton (1996a). As with the expert testimony scheme, the precise
formulation of the witness testimony scheme also depends on what may be
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presumed. On our account, the witness’ veracity, objectivity and observational sensitivity are presumed (alternatively, they can be regarded as
additional premises of the relevant schemes).
R8: Witness testimonies: ‘Witness W says u’ is a prima facie reason for
believing u.
We deﬁne the following undercutter for this scheme: ‘‘Witness W is not
truthful’’ is an undercutter of R8.
Must we also formulate lack of a witness’ objectivity and observational
sensitivity as undercutters of this scheme? We think that this is not necessary,
since a witness will usually talk about his or her past observations, so usually
it will be possible to interpret u as ‘‘I recall that I observed w’’. On this
account, arguments using witness testimonies apply a chain of three prima
facie reasons: ﬁrst the witness scheme is used to infer ‘‘I recall I observed w’’,
then the memory scheme provides ‘‘I observed w’’ and ﬁnally the perception
scheme yields w. Thus lack of objectivity can be handled by undercutters of
both memory and perception, and defects in observational sensitivity by
undercutters of perception. Summarising, on our account the ﬁrst premise of
the scheme as presented in Section 3.2 is decomposed into undercutters of the
perception and memory reasons R1 and R2, while the second premise is
captured as the sole premise of R8.
However, a reﬁnement of this analysis is necessary. If we have a closer look
at Pollock’s perception and memory reasons, we see that they provide reasons
for a single agent to form beliefs on the basis of the agent’s own memory or
observations. By contrast, memories and observations of witnesses are used
by other agents to form beliefs, such as triers of fact. Accordingly, the memory
and perception reasons must be generalised. Perception becomes:
R1’: Perception: Agent Ai having a percept with content u is a prima facie
reason for agent Aj to believe u
(where Ai and Aj may or may not be identical). Likewise for the memory
reason.

4.4.

OUTLINE OF A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE UMILIAN CASE

We now brieﬂy outline a formal analysis of the Umilian case (for a more
detailed analysis, see Prakken 2004). Obviously, the Umilian case contains
several uses of the witness testimony scheme. Wigmore discusses one attack
on such a use, viz. an attack on the inference of 16 from 17 on the ground
that the witness was a discharged employee of the suspect (angle 18(2) and its
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Figure 3. Temporal Persistence in the Umilian case.

supporting child nodes). This is an undercutter, concluding to ‘‘the witness is
not truthful’’. The case also seems to contain two applications of the
temporal persistence scheme (although Wigmore’s chart leaves them implicit.
Firstly, the revengeful emotion created when the priest refuses to marry U is
assumed to persist till the time of the murder (shown in Figure 3 as a possible
extension of Figure 2). This persistence argument is undercut by the
argument that the emotion disappeared when the priest still agreed to marry
U. This conclusion in turn persists till the time of the murder. Arguably, this
application of temporal persistence is undercut by the argument that the
emotion was recreated since U and J remained in daily contact and U’s wife
also remained there. The other inferences in the chart all seem to be based on
implicit generalisations, which all seem to be of the general-knowledge,
experience-based or belief-based type.
Determining the dialectical status of node 8 in our Pollock-style analysis,
two sources of doubt prevent it from being a defeasible consequence of the
theory. The ﬁrst is the rebutting argument for node 18. This attack should be
neutralised either by looking at the relative strength of the conﬂicting
arguments, or by somehow undercutting the appeals to witness testimony on
which node 18 is based. The second source of doubt is that one of the
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supporting child nodes, node 16, is undercut. This attack can be neutralised
by providing alternative evidence of 16, or by attacking the argument that
witness 17 is biased. An obvious target for such an attack seems the
generalisation 19d.

5. A second case study: Sacco and Vanzetti
We now turn to an analysis of a modern use of Wigmore’s charting method,
as used by Kadane and Schum (1996) in their probabilistic analysis of the
Sacco and Vanzetti case. Unlike our brief informal account of the Umilian
case, we will now give our Pollock-style reconstruction in full detail, in order
to fully illustrate our approach and to learn more about it.

5.1.

THE SACCO AND VANZETTI CASE

We start with a brief description of the case (following Kadane and
Schum’s (1996) own description). Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti
were convicted and executed for shooting and killing a payroll guard,
Alessandro Berardelli, during a robbery that took place in South
Braintree, Massachusetts on April 15, 1920. Berardelli and another
payroll guard, Frederick Parmenter, were supposed to take a total of
over $15,000 in two iron boxes from one factory of the Slater and Morril
shoe factory to the second Slater and Morril factory in South Braintree.
During their route, they passed two men leaning against a piperail fence
and, as they passed, were attacked from behind by these two men.
Berardelli was shot four times and Parmenter two times. After this, the
two men picked up the iron boxes containing the money and ﬂed, along
with three other men, in a black touring car which had approached the
scene of the crime. Berardelli died about an hour later, Parmenter
succumbed to his wounds the following morning.
Sacco and Vanzetti were known members of an anarchist movement in the
U.S. The investigators knew that members of an anarchist group were
involved in the robbery, and following a series of events, Sacco and Vanzetti
were arrested on May 5. After a long trial with many witnesses, they were
found guilty of the shooting of Berardelli while performing a criminal act, the
robbery. An appeals process was launched and the Governor of Massachusetts launched his own investigation of the case. The committee entitled with
this investigation also found Sacco and Vanzetti guilty as charged. Final
appeals to the Supreme Court did not have any eﬀect, and on August 23,
1927, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed.
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Numerous books and articles have been written on this case by experts
from ﬁelds including law, history and social sciences, since many felt that the
case was probably one of the worst miscarriages of justice in American legal
history. Recent studies of, for example, Young and Kaiser (1985) have
introduced new evidence and evidence never introduced at the trial. Kadane
and Schum carried a thorough probabilistic analysis of the case based on
their modernised, more user-friendly version of Wigmore’s charting method.
Their analysis consisted of two parts. First they represented all the available
evidence in 28 connected Wigmore charts, and then they used several of these
charts to carry out probabilistic sensitivity analyses. Such an analysis intends
to investigate the sensitivity of a probabilistic variable of interest (for
instance, whether it was Sacco who shot Berardelli) to variations in the
probability of other variables (for instance, whether Sacco was one of the
men leaning against the piperail fence just before the murder). To carry out
this analysis, Kadane and Schum reinterpreted their Wigmore charts of the
case as Bayesian probabilistic networks, added various estimates of probability distributions on the networks and investigated their consequences
with standard software tools for Bayesian networks.

5.2.

THE WIGMORE CHART

Our case study concerns one of Kadane and Schum’s Wigmore charts, viz.
Chart 4 (p. 290) which displays evidence concerning the identiﬁcation of
Sacco as present at the scene of the crime while it was being committed. This
chart was chosen since it is of realistic yet manageable size and since it
illustrates the use of most of the prima facie reasons discussed above. We
have copied the chart in Figure 4. Our analysis concerns only part of the
chart. We take the proposition labelled ‘18’ in the chart, that Sacco was at the
scene of the robbery when it occurred, as the main probandum and therefore
ignore the part of the chart above node 18. Also, we ignore the post-trial
Young and Kaiser evidence (labelled YK in the chart).
The directly relevant evidence given by the prosecution’s witnesses and its
interim probanda are represented as circles, and the ancillary evidence given
by the prosecution’s witnesses and its interim probanda are represented as
squares. The prosecution had two witnesses. Lewis Pelser testiﬁed (26) that he
saw Sacco at the scene of the robbery and the shootings from the window of
the Rice and Hutchins factory. The prosecution inferred from this that Sacco
was at the scene of the crime (18). Lewis Wade testiﬁed (25) that he saw
someone who looked like Sacco at the scene of the crime (18a), which,
according to the prosecution, implied that Sacco was at the scene of the
crime. The directly relevant evidence given by the defense witnesses and its
interim probanda are represented as diamonds, and the ancillary evidence
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Figure 4. Chart 4 of Kadane and Schum (1996).

given by the defense witnesses and its interim probanda are represented as
triangles. A defense witness called Albert Frantello testiﬁed (324) that Sacco
was not one of the men leaning against the fence when he passed it 5 min
before the robbery occurred (323). The defense argued from this that Sacco
could thus not have been at the scene of the crime when the robbery took
place. The reasoning from Frantello’s testimony was strengthened by the fact
that, according to Frantello (326), the man on the fence spoke ‘‘American’’
(325) while, as observable during trial (328) Sacco spoke broken English
(327). The prosecution argued that Frantello’s powers of observation were
weak (329) since at cross-examination (330) he incorrectly identiﬁed
characteristics of jurors he had been asked to view, and thus his testimony
carried less weight towards 323. Further defense witnesses were brought forth
to cast doubt upon whether Pelser could have actually seen the robbery.
McCullum testiﬁed (318c) that Pelser could not have seen the shooting for
reasons not further speciﬁed (318b). Constantino testiﬁed (317) that Pelser
was under a bench when the shootings took place (316), and thus Pelser could
not have seen the shooting, weakening the link between 26 and 18. On crossexamination (318a), however, Constantino had doubts about his observation
(318), weakening his own argument that Pelser was under the bench. Pelser
nevertheless admitted (319) that he was under the bench on cross-examination, strengthening 316. Brenner testiﬁed (321) that Pelser was not near the
window (320) so that he could not have seen the robbery. At his crossexamination, Brenner also expressed (322a) doubts about where Pelser was
(322), weakening the defense’s argument from 321 to 320.
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A FORMAL RECONSTRUCTION

We now transform our selection from Kadane and Schum’s Chart 4 into a
formalisation in Pollock’s system as explained in Section 4. This formalisation
is a shorter and revised version of the one given in Bex (2003). We have tried to
be faithful to the original chart except in one or two places where a slightly
diﬀerent interpretation is necessary. Moreover, we have added generalisations
wherever they are left implicit in the original chart. Of course our choices can
be debated but, as remarked above in Section 4.2, the point of making
generalisations explicit is precisely to make them the subject of debate.
The chart contains two main witnesses for the prosecution, Wade and
Pelser. We start with Wade’s testimony that he saw someone who looked like
Sacco at the scene of the crime when the robbery and shooting occurred. From
this an argument can be built for the claim that Sacco was at the crime scene.
Argument P1 (Kadane and Schum: 25  18a)
1. Wade says: ‘‘I recall I saw someone who looked like Sacco at the crime
scene when the crime occurred’’ (Input);
2. Wade recalls having seen someone who looked like Sacco at the crime
scene when the crime occurred (1, Witness Testimony);
3. Wade saw someone who looks like Sacco at the crime scene when the
crime occurred (2, Memory);
4. if a person X saw someone who looks like person Y, then usually X saw Y
(Input);
5. Wade saw Sacco at the crime scene when the crime occurred (3,4, Stat.
Syll.);
6. Sacco was at the crime scene when the crime occurred (5, Perception).
Wade’s argument was weakened by the fact that he would not admit that it
was Sacco who shot Berrardelli. Wade never denied that the man he saw
‘‘looked like Sacco’’, but he did express his doubts about the fact that the
man he saw actually was Sacco. This gives rise to the following undercutting
argument, which begins in the same way as the ﬁrst argument.
Argument D1 (Kadane and Schum: 334d  334c)
1. Wade says: ‘‘I recall I saw someone who looked like Sacco at the scene of
the crime when it occurred’’ (Input);
2. Wade recalls having seen someone who looked like Sacco at the scene of
the crime when it occurred (1, Witness Testimony);
3. Wade saw someone who looks like Sacco at the scene of the crime when it
occurred (2, Memory);
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4. Wade would not say ‘‘Sacco is the man I saw shooting Berrardelli at the
crime’’ (Input);
5. if a person X saw someone who looked like person Y, but X will not
testify he saw Y, then usually X has doubts about Y’s look-alike being Y
(Input);
6. Wade had doubts about the fact that the man who looked like Sacco
actually was Sacco (3,4,5, Stat. Syll.);
7. if a person X saw someone who looks like person Y, but X has doubts
about Y ’s look-alike being Y, then it is not usually the case that if a
person X saw someone who looks like Person Y, then person X saw person
Y (Input);
8. Wade saw someone who looks like Sacco at the scene of the crime when it
occurred and Wade had doubts about the fact that the man who looked
like Sacco actually was Sacco and If a person X saw someone who looks
like person Y, but X has doubts about Y’s look-alike being Y, then it is not
usually the case that if a person X saw someone who looks like Person Y,
then person X saw person Y (3,6,7, strict reason).
This argument undercuts argument P1 at line 5. It is an instance of the
subproperty defeater of the statistical syllogism: the antecedent of the
generalisation 7 in D1 is more speciﬁc than the antecedent of the generalisation
4 in P1 and it has a contradictory consequent.
The second main prosecution witness, Pelser, testiﬁed that he saw Sacco
from the window of the Rice and Hutchins factory. This gives rise to a second
argument for the claim that Sacco was at the crime. (To make the
observational-sensitivity undercutters apply to Pelser’s testimony, we interpret it as an example of self-observation).
Argument P2 (Kadane and Schum: 26  18)
1. Pelser says ‘‘I recall that I experienced I was at the window and that I saw
Sacco at the scene of the crime when it occurred’’ (Input);
2. Pelser recalls that he experienced he was at the window and that saw
Sacco at the scene of the crime when it occurred (1, Witness
Testimony);
3. Pelser experienced he was at the window and Pelser saw Sacco at the scene
of the crime when it occurred (2, Memory);
4. Pelser saw Sacco at the scene of the crime when it occurred (3, strict
reason);
5. Sacco was at the scene of the crime when it occurred (4, Perception).
The defense witnesses McCullum, Constantino, Brenner and Frantello all
cast doubt on Pelser’s testimony. McCullum gave an equivocal testimony
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from which the defense argued that Pelser could not have seen Sacco (318c 
318b), but McCullum was not clear on why Pelser could not have seen Sacco,
so his testimony is ambiguous between an undercutter of the Witness,
Memory or Perception reason. We formalise it as an undercutter of the
Perception reason.
Argument D2 (Kadane and Schum: 318c  318b)
1. McCullum says: ‘‘I recall that Pelser could not have seen Sacco’’ (Input);
2. McCullum recalls that Pelser could not have seen Sacco (1, Witness
Testimony);
3. Pelser could not have seen Sacco (2, Memory);
4. X could not have seen P ﬁ X ’s perception of P is not a reliable indicator
of P (Input);
5. Pelser’s perception of Sacco at the scene of the crime when it occurred is
not a reliable indicator of this fact (3,4, strict reason).
Argument D2 undercuts the application of the Perception reason at line 5 of
argument P2.
The second defense witness, Constantino, testiﬁed that Pelser was not at
the window so that he could not have seen Sacco (from the window). Like
McCullum’s testimony, Constantino’s testimony is also ambiguous in how
exactly it attacks Pelser’s testimony. For purposes of illustration we formalise
it as an undercutter of the Witness Testimony reason.
Argument D3 (Kadane and Schum: 317  316)
1. Constantino says ‘‘I recall I have seen Pelser under a bench’’ (Input);
2. Constantino recalls having seen Pelser under a bench (1, Witness
Testimony);
3. Constantino saw Pelser under a bench (2, Memory);
4. Pelser was under a bench (3, Perception);
5. Pelser was under a bench ﬁ Pelser was not at the window (Input);
6. Pelser was not at the window (4,5, strict reason);
7. it is not the case that Pelser was at the window and that he saw Sacco at
the scene of the crime when it occurred (6, strict reason);
8. if X says he recalls he was in circumstances Y but X was not in
circumstances Y, then usually X is not truthful. (Input);
9. Pelser says ‘‘I recall that I was at the window and that I saw Sacco at the
scene of the crime when it occurred’’ (Input);
10. Pelser is not truthful (7,8,9, Stat. Syll.).
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Argument D3 undercuts the application of the Witness testimony reason at
line 2 of argument P2.
Constantino admitted during cross-examination that he had doubts about
where Pelser was. It is not exactly clear from Kadane and Schum (1996) why
Constantino had these doubts. This is a third example of a testimony that is
ambiguous in its nature. We interpret Constantino’s doubts as about his
memory of Pelser’s whereabouts:
Argument P3 (Kadane and Schum: 318a  318)
1. Constantino says ‘‘I have doubts about my memory of Pelser’s whereabouts’’ (Input);
2. Constantino has doubts about his memory of Pelser’s whereabouts (1,
Witness testimony);
3. if a witness has doubts about his memory of P, then usually P was
originally based on false beliefs (Input);
4. Constantino’s recollection of having seen Pelser under a bench was
originally based on false beliefs (2,3, Stat. Syll.).
Argument P3 undercuts the application of the memory reason at line 3 of
argument D3, using the ﬁrst undercutter of this scheme.
Witness Brenner did not say where Pelser was, but he did testify that Pelser
was not near the window. This gives rise to an attack on P2 similar to D3.
Argument D4 (Kadane and Schum: 321  320)
1. Brenner says: ‘‘I recall I saw that Pelser was not near the window’’
(Input);
2. Brenners recalls having seen that Pelser was not near the window (1,
Witness Testimony);
3. Brenner saw that Pelser was not near the window (2, Memory);
4. Pelser was not near the window (3, Perception);
5. Pelser was not near the window ﬁ Pelser was not at the window
(Input);
6. Pelser was not at the window (4,5, strict reason).
And further as argument D3.
On cross-examination, Brenner also expressed doubts about his memory.
Argument P4 (Kadane and Schum: 322a  322)
1. Brenner says ‘‘I have doubts about my memory of Pelser’s whereabouts’’
(Input);
2. Brenner has doubts about his memory of Pelser’s whereabouts (1, Witness
testimony);
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3. If a witness has doubts about his memory of P, then usually P was
originally based on false beliefs (Input);
4. Brenner’s recollection of having seen that Pelser was not near the window
was originally based on false beliefs (2,3, Stat. Syll.).
Argument P4 undercuts the application of the memory reason at line 3 of
argument D4, using the ﬁrst undercutter of this reason.
The ﬁnal defense witness, Frantello, testiﬁed that Sacco was not at the
scene of the crime 5 min before it happened. Frantello also testiﬁed that
he heard the man leaning on the pipe-rail fence who might resemble Sacco
speak American. This contradicts the fact observable in court that Sacco
speaks broken English. Kadane and Schum regard the latter two facts as
two pieces of ancillary evidence strengthening Frantello’s that Sacco was
not at the scene of the crime 5 min before it happened. We think that it is
more natural to formalise Frantello’s statements as two independent
testimonies and the observable fact as a component in one of them. See
further Section 5.4 below.
Argument D5 (Kadane and Schum: 324  323)
1. Frantello says ‘‘I recall I saw that Sacco was not one of the men leaning on
the pipe-rail fence 5 min before the crime’’ (Input);
2. Frantello recalls that he saw that Sacco was not one of the men leaning on
the pipe-rail fence 5 min before the crime (1, Witness testimony);
3. Frantello saw that Sacco was not one of the men leaning on the pipe-rail
fence 5 min before the crime (2, Memory);
4. Sacco was not one of the men leaning on the pipe-rail fence 5 min before
the crime (3, Perception);
5. If Sacco was not one of the men leaning on the pipe-rail fence 5 min
before the crime then presumably Sacco was not at scene of the crime
5 min before it occurred (Input);
6. Sacco was not at scene of the crime 5 min before it occurred (5, Stat.
Syll.);
7. Sacco was not at the scene of the crime when it occurred (6, Temporal
persistence).
Argument D5 rebuts and is rebut by line 6 of P1 and line 5 of P2. Note, by the
way, that line (5) is a case-speciﬁc generalisation; this is why we have
expressed it with ‘‘presumably’’ instead of with ‘‘usually’’.
Argument D6 (Kadane and Schum: 326  325 and 328  327)
1. Frantello: ‘‘I recall I heard the man leaning on the fence 5 min before the
crime speak American’’ (Input);
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2. Frantello recalls having heard the man leaning on the fence 5 min before
the crime speak American (1, Witness testimony);
3. Frantello heard the man leaning on the fence 5 min before the crime
speak American (2, Memory);
4. The man leaning on the fence 5 min before the crime spoke American (3,
Perception);
5. Sacco speaks broken English (Input);
6. if the man leaning on the fence 5 min before the crime spoke American
and Sacco speaks broken English then presumably Sacco was not the
man leaning on the fence 5 min before the crime (Input);
7. Sacco was not one of the men leaning on the pipe-rail fence 5 min before
the crime (4,5,6, Stat. Syll.);
8. if Sacco was not one of the men leaning on the pipe-rail fence 5 min
before the crime then presumably Sacco was not at scene of the crime
5 min before it occurred (Input);
9. Sacco was not at scene of the crime 5 min before it occurred (7,8, Stat.
Syll.);
10. Sacco was not at the scene of the crime when it occurred (9, Temporal
persistence).
Argument D6 also rebuts and is rebut by line 6 of P1 and line 5 of P2. (Note
that line 6 of D6 contains another case-speciﬁc generalisation.)
Frantello’s cross-examination in the courtroom gives rise to a counterargument against D5 and D6, since Frantello performed poorly in recalling
characteristics of some of the jurors he had been asked to view.
Argument P5 (Kadane and Schum: 330  329)
1. Frantello incorrectly identiﬁed characteristic of jurors he had been asked
to view (Input);
2. If person X cannot identify characteristics of people he has been asked to
view, then usually X ’s observational powers are weak (Input);
3. Frantello’s observational powers are weak (1,2, Stat. Syll.);
4. if a person’s observational powers are weak, then that person having a
percept of P usually is not a reliable indicator of P (Input);
5. Frantello having seen that the man on the fence was not Sacco is not a
reliable indicator for the fact that the man on the fence was not Sacco (3,4,
Stat. Syll.).
Argument P5 undercuts the application of the Perception reason at line 4 of
arguments D5 and D6.
Although thus all four defense witnesses who cast doubt on Pelser’s
testimony can be attacked, Pelser himself admitted during cross-examination

TOWARDS A FORMAL ACCOUNT OF REASONING ABOUT EVIDENCE

155

that was under a bench. Like Constantino’s testimony, Pelser’s is also
ambiguous in the precise way it undermines his original testimony. We
interpret it in the same way as Constantino’s testimony.
Argument D7 (Kadane and Schum: 319  316)
1. Pelser says ‘‘I recall I experienced I was under a bench’’ (Input);
2. Pelser recalls he experienced he was under a bench (1, Witness
testimony);
3. Pelser experienced he was under a bench (2, Memory);
4. Pelser was under a bench (3, Perception).
And further as argument D3.
Argument D7 undercuts the application of the Witness Testimony reason at
line 2 of argument P2.
What remains is to determine the dialectical status of all arguments.
Figure 5 shows all arguments, their defeat relations and their status: the grey
arguments are justiﬁed and the blank arguments are overruled (in this case

Figure 5. The argument graph.
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grounded and preferred semantics yield the same result). Because of space
limitations this ﬁgure does not represent the structure of the arguments or the
exact ways in which arguments defeat each other. Thin lines stand for
rebutting defeat relations and thick lines for undercutting defeat relations.
Since we have not speciﬁed strengths of arguments, all mutually rebutting
arguments defeat each other, while all undercutting arguments strictly defeat
their target. A decision maker or analyst could use such information to
determine the consequences of his or her relative assessments of conﬂicting
arguments. If one argument of a rebutting pair is regarded as signiﬁcantly
stronger than another, than their mutual defeat relation will turn into a onesided relation. If an undercutting argument is regarded as stronger than or
equally strong as its target, the strict defeat relation remains unchanged.
However, if it is regarded as weaker, the result depends on whether Pollock’s
treatment of weak undercutters is followed or not. According to Pollock
(1995) an undercutter that is weaker than its target does not defeat it. This
has the somewhat strange consequence that an undercutting argument and its
target can both be dialectically justiﬁed. An alternative solution is to let
undercutting result in defeat whatever the strength is of the undercutter. We
adopt he latter solution, resulting in the dialectical assessment of the
arguments as shown in Figure 5. It turns out that both of the prosecution’s
arguments that Sacco was at the scene of the crime when it occurred are
overruled. To turn, say, P1 into a justiﬁed argument, the trier of fact should
ﬁnd a convincing counterattack on both of Frantello’s testimonies (D5 and
D6) and on Wade’s doubts at cross-examination (D1).

6. Discussion
We now draw some conclusions from the case study and discuss some issues
that arise from it.

6.1.

REVEALING SOURCES OF DOUBT

Both Wigmore and Kadane and Schum stress that one beneﬁt of the charting
method is that it reveals sources of doubt in evidential arguments. One way in
which our analysis achieves this is that it forces us to make implicit
generalisations explicit. In many cases these generalisations will become the
subject of debate and testing (see e.g., Wagenaar et al., 1993; Twining 1999,
for instructive examples). Another way in which our analysis reveals sources
of doubt is by indicating the precise argumentation schemes used in an
argument. Thus we are, for instance, able to represent the fact that Wade’s
testimony is (ceteris paribus) inherently weaker than Pelser’s: in our analysis

TOWARDS A FORMAL ACCOUNT OF REASONING ABOUT EVIDENCE

157

Wade’s testimony has an additional attacking point, viz. the generalisation
‘‘If a person X saw someone who looks like person Y, then usually X saw Y ’’.
This generalisation was the target of the counterargument D1. A similar
counterargument cannot be launched against Pelser’s testimony as used in
argument P2.

6.2.

DIFFERENT LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION

A few times a counterargument was stated at a higher level of abstraction
than its target. For instance, while Pelser’s testimony was decomposed into
applications of the Memory, Witness Testimony and Perception schemes, the
testimonies of the counterwitnesses McCullum, Constantino and Brenner did
not speciﬁcally attack any of these three inferences but instead seem to be an
attack on the more abstract version of the witness testimony scheme that
witnesses usually speak the truth. We think that this is not a weakness of our
approach or the underlying formalism; any analysis of a reasoning problem
will have to choose an appropriate level of abstraction. However, this
problem may oﬀer a justiﬁcation for representing argumentation schemes as
generalisations (i.e., as propositions) instead of as reasons (i.e., as inference
rules): if depending on the dialogical context argumentation schemes can be
expressed at diﬀerent levels of abstraction, then it may not be wise to ﬁx their
formulation in a set of inference rules. Finally, in dialogical models of
evidential reasoning it may be interesting to investigate principles that
enforce dialogues to be coherent in their level of abstraction, or to investigate
moves in a dialogue that are suitable for changing the dialogue’s level of
abstraction. For instance, Loui and Norman (1995) model moves for
‘unpacking’ an opponent’s argument ‘‘P therefore Q’’ into ‘‘P therefore R,
therefore Q’’ and then attacking the new argument on its intermediate
conclusion R.

6.3.

ANCILLARY EVIDENCE

Ancillary evidence is evidence that has a bearing on the probative force of
other evidence. In their charts, Kadane and Schum depict ancillary evidence
as links from a node to an evidence link. In our formal reconstruction
ancillary evidence can be represented in various ways, depending on its exact
nature. Ancillary evidence weakening the probative force of a piece of
evidence is easily modelled as a counterargument, usually an undercutter. See
for instance, argument P5 on Frantello’s weak observational powers,
attacking the arguments D5 and D6 based on his testimony. However, the
modelling of ancillary supporting evidence is less obvious. Kadane and
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Schum depict Frantello’s testimony as ancillary evidence, drawing links from
his testimony 326 and the observable fact 328 to the link between 324 and
323. However, it seems hard to see how the testimony 326 supports the link
between Frantello’s other testimony and the claim 323. It seems more natural
to regard these testimonies as two separate reasons for the same claim, which
may be stronger when combined than when considered in isolation. We
formalised this interpretation in arguments D5 and D6.This brings us to the
issue of accrual of reasons. First, however, we note that genuine supporting
ancillary evidence will often be stated in the form of counterattacks on
undercutting arguments. For instance, an attack on a witness’s truthfulness
may be countered with reasons why he is truthful.

6.4.

ACCRUAL OF REASONS

Something which has not been modelled in the arguments above is the
accrual of reasons for a conclusion. For example, both Wade’s and Pelser’s
testimonies are used to conclude that Sacco was at the scene of the crime
when it occurred, and Constantino’s and Brenner’s testimonies can be
combined with Pelser’s testimony at cross-examination to conclude that
Pelser was not truthful. Most, if not all, triers of fact operate under the
assumption that, other things being equal, a higher number of witnesses
testifying to the same proposition increases the evidential support of that
proposition. How can this assumption be modelled in our account? It has
been suggested that an argument based on accrual of reasons is neither an
argument with disjunctive premises nor one with conjunctive premises but a
special type of argument (e.g., Walton 1996b). Verheij (1996) argues that an
argument-based logic should somehow let the force of these two arguments
accrue to reﬂect the fact that having two arguments for a conclusion is
stronger than having one argument. Against this, Pollock (1995, pp. 101-102)
argues that accrual of arguments (or reasons) is not a matter of logic.
Discussing the example of witness testimonies (which he expresses as a
generalisation ‘‘Witnesses usually speak the truth’’ and applies with the
statistical syllogism), he argues that whether witness testimonies accrue,
depends on the linguistic community which the speakers are part of. We
could have, for example, one community in which speakers make assertions
completely independently of each other, and then the strength of the
combined reason would be greater than the strength of either of the separate
reasons. But we could also be dealing with a community where the second
speaker tends to assert every proposition of which the ﬁrst speaker said it was
false. Then the strength of the combined reason would be less than the
strength of the ﬁrst separate reason. Thus, Pollock argues, the degree of
justiﬁcation for a proposition in such cases depends on a separate instance of
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the statistical syllogism, applied to a separate generalisation ‘‘If two witnesses
say that P, then usually P’’.
Let us see how this account can be formalised in our present use of
Pollock’s framework. One way is to apply the Witness Testimony and
Memory Reasons to the individual testimonies and to combine the resulting
observation statements in a many-agent version of the Perception reason. In
fact, a new version of this reason is needed for each natural number n. These
reasons are combined in the following template:
R1n: Multiple-agent observations: ‘Agent A1 observed u and ... and agent An
observed u’ is a prima facie reason for agent A to believe u.
(where A may or may not be among Ai, . . . , An). The undercutters of the
original Perception reason also apply to each multiple-agent version of
perception. Note that attacks on the witness’s veracity and objectivity can
still be modelled as undercutters of the reasons applied to the individual
testimonies. Does R1n also have new undercutters? An often-used way to
discredit appeals to multiple witnesses is to argue that the witnesses conferred
before their testimonies and knowingly or unknowingly inﬂuenced each
other’s testimonies. We think that this can still be represented as attacks on
the individual testimonies. For instance, if witnesses conferred to fabricate a
story, then the following generalisation gives rise to an instance of the
truthfulness undercutter:
If Witness Wi conferred with agent Aj before his testimony to fabricate a
story then usually Wi is not truthful.
The situation that witnesses are truthful but are inﬂuenced in unconscious
ways so that they are not objective, can be expressed as an additional
undercutter of the Memory reason:
‘Agent Ai recalls u but was inﬂuenced concerning u before recalling it’ is an
undercutter of R2’.
Note that this undercutter also covers cases where a witness was inﬂuenced
by, for instance, news reports.
Let us illustrate our proposal with the testimonies of Constantino,
Brenner and Pelser-at-cross-examination that Pelser was not at the window
of the Rice and Hutchins factory when the crime occurred. An instance of
R1n must be used with n ¼ 3. (We leave implicit the parts of the argument
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that conclude to 1,4 and 7. Note that premises 2,5 and 8 capture that,
although the witnesses made diﬀerent statements, these statements all imply
the same thing.)
Argument D8
1. Constantino saw Pelser was under a bench (line 3 of D3);
2. Constantino saw that Pelser was under a bench ﬁ Constantino saw that
Pelser was not at the window (Input);
3. Constantino saw that Pelser was not at the window (1,2, strict reason);
4. Brenner saw that Pelser was not near the window’’ (line 3 of D4);
5. Brenner saw that Pelser was not near the window ﬁ Brenner saw that
Pelser was not at the window (Input);
6. Brenner saw that Pelser was not at the window (5,6, strict reason);
7. Pelser experienced he was under a bench’’ (line 3 of D7);
8. Pelser experienced he was under a bench ﬁ Pelser experienced he was
not at the window (Input);
9. Pelser experienced he was not at the window (3,4, strict reason);
10. Pelser was not at the window (3,6,9, R13).
Note that P3 undercuts D3 and thereby D8 while P4 undercuts D4 and thereby
D8. Interestingly, the testimonies might be combined again to save D8, viz. in
a generalisation
If a witness has doubts about his memory of P but other witnesses also recall
P, then it is not usually the case that P was originally based on false beliefs
This generalisation gives rise to a subproperty defeater of P3 and P4 at
their lines 4 so that D8 is reinstated. However, suppose that for whatever
reason the defeater of P4 is in turn defeated. Then this attempt to
reinstate D8 does not work. If the trier-of-fact still wants to conclude that
Pelser was not at the window on the basis of Constantino’s and Pelser’s
testimonies, then s/he has to formulate a weaker version of D8 with an
instance of R1n with n ¼ 2.
One consequence of this analysis is that the set of relevant arguments in
our case study is larger than as depicted in Figure 5: since we now have R1n
as a reason, we must add four new arguments in Figure 5: Wade + Pelser,
Constantino + Brenner, Constantino + Pelser, Brenner + Pelser and
Constantino + Pelser + Brenner. By contrast, in formalisms that somehow
aggregate multiple reasons, such as Bayesian Networks, Reason-based logic
(Hage 1996) or Krause et al. (1995) LA system it suﬃces to represent a link
from each individual observation statement to the supported claim; the
aggregation mechanism ensures that only the applicable statements exert
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their inﬂuence on the claim (note, however, that in such formalism the
strength of the combined reasons is still independent of the strengths of the
individual reasons; this agrees with Pollock’s analysis of accrual). It remains
to be seen whether this diﬀerence is an advantage or a disadvantage of the
present approach. For instance, our approach induces the following kind of
dialogue, which seems quite natural:
D: Constantino, Brenner and Pelser observed that Pelser was not at the
window, so, Pelser was not at the window.
P: But Brenner was not sure about his memory where Pelser was.
D: OK, but still Constantino’s and Pelser’s observations together suﬃce to
prove that Pelser was not at the window.
The problem of accrual of reasons is not conﬁned to witness testimonies.
Firstly, sometimes generalisations have to be combined. For instance, the
arguments D5 and D6 based on Frantello’s testimonies both use a
generalisation with the consequent ‘Sacco was not the man leaning on the
fence 5 min before the crime’, viz. at line 5 of D5 and line 6 of D6. To combine
Frantello’s two testimonies, a third generalisation must be formulated with
the same consequent but conjoining the antecedents of these two generalisations. Applying the statistical syllogism to the new generalisation results in
a ﬁfth addition to the argument graph of Figure 5.
The most complicated case of accrual is when reasons of a diﬀerent
nature have to be combined. For instance, the prosecution presented
another piece of evidence against Sacco, viz. a cap that was found at the
crime scene that allegedly belonged to Sacco. This gives rise to another
argument for the conclusion that Sacco was at the scene of the crime
when it occurred, based on a generalisation, say ‘If a cap found at the
scene of the crime belongs to Sacco, then presumably Sacco was at the
scene of the crime’, to which the statistical syllogism can be applied. To
combine this argument with Wade’s and Pelser’s testimonies, reason R1n
cannot be used. Instead the generalisation used in the new argument must
be combined with Wade’s and Pelser’s testimonies into a new generalisation:
If witnesses W1 and W2 observed that Sacco was at the scene of the crime
when it occurred and a cap found at the scene of the crime belongs to Sacco,
then presumably Sacco was at the scene of the crime.
In fact, the need for this generalisation yields a second reason why it might be
better to formulate the argumentation schemes introduced in this paper as
generalisations (the ﬁrst reason we identiﬁed was that witness testimonies are
often expressed at diﬀerent levels of abstraction).
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7. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied how some common reasoning forms used in
evidential legal reasoning can be analysed within general theories of
defeasible reasoning and argumentation. We have seen that within Pollock’s
logic for defeasible argumentation a natural account can be given of two key
concepts of evidential reasoning, viz. argumentation schemes and generalisations, in a way that captures the spirit of both Wigmore’s charts and recent
research of evidence theory scholars. Our account made it possible to
formally distinguish four ways in which generalisations can be attacked. We
have also discussed a method for combining diﬀerent pieces of evidence
supporting the same conclusion, especially witness statements. Our discussion suggests that combining evidence in an argument-based framework leads
to less compact representations of a problem than in, for instance, Bayesian
networks or reason-based logic, but that an argument-based approach may
induce more natural dialogues.
As for related research, we know of only one earlier formal proposal to
model evidential legal reasoning as defeasible argumentation, viz. Verheij
(2000). He develops his proposal as an alternative to Wagenaar et al. (1993)
anchored-narratives theory. According to this theory legal proof should have
the form of persuasive stories about what happened. The stories should not
only be persuasive but also be anchored in the available evidence with
empirical generalisations. An important aspect of the anchored-narratives
theory is that these anchors should be progressively reﬁned in a critical
testing procedure until they are suﬃciently plausible to be accepted. Verheij
argues like us that anchors can be modelled as default rules, which can be
used to build arguments and, being defeasible, give rise to counterarguments.
(Twining (1999) also claims that arguments are a good alternative to stories,
stressing some dangers of using stories in legal proof, such as that they can
deceptively appeal to the emotions of the triers of fact.) Verheij also stresses
the need for a formal theory of the dynamics of fact-ﬁnding investigations, to
account for the testing of generalisations as proposed in the anchored
narratives theory. Finally, Verheij (2002) suggests like us that argumentation
schemes can be regarded as defeasible inference rules and negative answers to
some critical questions as undercutters. Probably the main contributions of
the present paper to Verheij’s work are our detailed formal analysis of some
of the main argumentation schemes operative in evidential reasoning, our
systematic account of various ways to attack generalisations and our detailed
discussion of accrual of evidential arguments.
As for future research, our Pollock-style approach should be further
developed by adding qualitative means to express strength of evidential
arguments and by investigating more evidential argumentation schemes, such
as schemes for causal reasoning. Also, our suggested approach to accrual of
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reasons should be compared in more detail to approaches using other
formalisms, As for sense-making systems, it remains to be tested how our
argument-based account can be used to provide the formal foundations of
implemented sense-making systems and whether the possibility of expressing
argumentation schemes (as in Araucaria) is indeed a useful feature of such
systems. Another research issue concerns the treatment of diﬀerent levels of
abstraction in evidential reasoning. It has been stressed by e.g., Wagenaar
et al. (1993) and Verheij (2000) that evidential reasoning does not only
consist of the construction of arguments and counterarguments, but also in
the progressive reﬁnement of these arguments and the statements from which
they are composed. This was clearly illustrated by our second case study.
This issue should be addressed in models of the dynamics of fact-ﬁnding
investigation.
Finally, in this paper we have employed a high level of abstraction,
focussing mainly on the place of evidential reasoning forms in a general
theory of reasoning. When applying our account in a knowledge-based
system, it must be supplemented with detailed knowledge-engineering
research on the relevant knowledge and argumentation schemes used in
evidential arguments. Nevertheless, our account provides a framework in
which such detailed research can be put to use.

Note
1

Demos can be found at http://people.hofstra.edu/faculty/vern_r_walker/LegalReasoning.html
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